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REDUCING RACIAL BIAS IN CAPITAL JURY SELECTION BY
ELIMINATING PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
Kaitlin Bigger
JD. Candidate, 2018, American University Washington College of Law
B.A. Political Science, 2013, Appalachian State University

On May 23, 2016, the Supreme Court
addressed an area of capital trials continuously
prone to racial discrimination in its Foster v.
Chatman 1 decision. During voir dire, both
parties are given peremptory challenges 2 and
challenges for cause. 3 Challenging a juror for
cause requires a specific reason for removing
the juror, while peremptory challenges do
not. 4 For example, prospective jurors who
are morally opposed to the death penalty are
often removed for cause from sitting on a
murder trial in states where the prosecution is
allowed to seek the death penalty. Before
Timothy Foster's capital trial, the prosecution
used four of its ten peremptory strikes to
remove all of the prospective black jurors. 5
During the appeals process, Foster's counsel
was able to obtain the prosecution's voir dire
notes. 6 The copies of the jury venire list that
Foster's counsel obtained had each black
prospective jurors' name highlighted in bright
green with an indication at the top that green
"represent[ed] Blacks." 7 The prosecution also
turned over a handwritten list of "definite
NO's" that listed six potential jurors including
all five qualified black prospective jurors. 8
Upon review, the Court found that the
documentation clearly demonstrated racially
motivated use of peremptory challenges that
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. 9
After the Court released its ruling last
May, critics opined that the facts of Mr.
Foster's case were so egregious that the ruling
would have little effect on racism in the
criminal justice system as a whole. 10
However, based on the Foster decision, at least

two murder convictions were vacated and
remanded by the Supreme Court for further
review. 11 Regardless of the magnitude of the
decision's impact, the Foster case is a clear
example of how the safeguards put in place by
the Court to guarantee against racial bias in
jury selection are failing. 12
To remedy the repeated instances of
bias, the courts should do away with
peremptory strikes altogether. 13 Proponents
of keeping peremptory strikes argue that the
challenges have "very old credentials." 14
However, the potential for continued
discrimination during jury selection outweighs
any historical significance. Eliminating
peremptory strikes also poses no risk to
constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. In fact,
requiring transparency early on in the trial
process is essential to combat biases that the
parties involved may not even be aware that
they have.
Limiting voir dire challenges to strikes
only for cause would require both the
prosecution and defense to identify their
reasons for striking the juror. Forcing the
parties to state an actual reason to justify
striking a potential juror is likely to ensure that
racial bias is not the driving force behind the
challenge. 15 Implicit and explicit racial
discrimination is a hot topic in current events,
but the influence that race may have in the
fair administration of justice is a familiar foe.
Following Justice Marshall's suggestions in his
concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky 16 and
eliminating peremptory challenges would be
one critical step toward much overdue
equality.
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